Considers some of the ramifications that active externalist approaches might have for epistemology. See, however, Carter & Gordon (2014) for a recent criticism on the point of identifying understanding with strong cognitive achievement. Strevens, M. No Understanding Without Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013): 510-515. Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly, objectual understanding is attributed in sentences that take the form I understand X where X is or can be treated as a body of information or subject matter. Pritchard, meanwhile, claims that the matter of understandings compatibility with epistemic luck can be appreciated only against the background of a distinction between two kinds of epistemic luckintervening and environmentalboth of which are incompatible with knowledge. It is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge (Rayner, 2011).The fact that taking in knowledge has altered is evident in learning institutions today. Endorses the idea that when we consider how things would be if something was true, we increase our access to further truths. Knowledge in a Social World. Meanwhile, when discussing outright (as opposed to ideal) understanding, Kelp suggests that we adopt a contextualist perspective. On the other hand, there are explanationists, who argue that it is knowledge or evaluation of explanations that is doing the relevant work. Pros and cons of epistemology shift Changes in epistemology even though they have received several criticisms they have significantly played a critical role in the advancement of technology. There is little work focusing exclusively on the prospects of a non-factive construal of understanding-why; most authors, with a few exceptions, take it that understanding-why is obviously factive in a way that is broadly analogous to propositional knowledge. I side with positivism; which states knowledge can be found via empirical observations (obtained through the senses). Kvanvig (2013) claims that both of these views are mistaken, and in the course of doing so, locates curiosity at the center of his account of understandings value. Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay. With a wide range of subtly different accounts of understanding (both objectual and understanding-why) on the table, it will be helpful to consider how understanding interfaces with certain key debates in epistemology. See Elgin (2004) for some further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her account. What is it to have this ability to modify some mental representation? De Regt, H. and Dieks, D. A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. Synthese 144 (2005): 137-170. One natural place to start will be to examine the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck. Displacements of power in the realm of concepts accompany these new orientations. Whitcomb, D. Wisdom. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds. ), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Trout, J.D. While we would apply a description of better understanding to agent A even if the major difference between her and agent B was that A had additional true beliefs, we would also describe A as having better understanding than B if the key difference was that A had fewer false beliefs. On such a view, grasping talk could simply be jettisoned altogether. (iii) an ability to draw from the information that q the conclusion that p (or that probably p). But no one claims that science has as yet arrived at the truth about the motion of the planets. Some focus on understanding-why while others focus on objectual understanding. Uses the hypothesis of extended cognition to argue that understanding can be located (at least partly) outside the head. Contains the paradigmatic case of environmental epistemic luck (that is, the fake barn case). epistemological shift pros and cons. epistemological shift pros and cons. Includes further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her view of understanding. Contrary to premise (3), such abilities (of the sort referenced by Khalifa in premise 2 and 3) arguably need not involve discriminating between explanations, so long as one supposes that discriminating between explanations is something one has the reliable ability to do only if one could not very easily form a belief of the form when this is false. This consequence does not intuitively align with our practices of attributing understanding. An overview of wisdom, including its potential relationship to understanding. Given the extent to which grasping is highly associated with understanding and left substantively unspecified, it is perhaps unsurprising that the matter of how to articulate grasping-related conditions on understanding has proven to be rather divisive. At the other end of the spectrum, we might consider an extremely strong view of understandings factivity, according to which understanding a subject matter requires that all of ones beliefs about the subject matter in question are true. The surgeons successful bypass is valued differently when one is made aware that it was by luck that he picked an appropriate blood vessel for the bypass. Secondly, she concedes that it is possible that in some cases additional abilities must be added before the set of abilities will be jointly sufficient. Argues that the ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive and that epistemologists should therefore not concern themselves with said ordinary concept. Intervening epistemic luck is the sort present in the Gettiers original cases (1963) which convinced most epistemologists to abandon the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. Such cases she claims feature intervening luck that is compatible with understanding. . He takes his account to be roughly in line with the laymans concept of curiosity. A more sophisticated understanding has it that human beings and the other great apes descended from a common hominid ancestor (who was not, strictly speaking, an ape). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Though her work on understanding is not limited to scientific understanding (for example, Elgin 2004), one notable argument she has made is framed to show that a factive conception cannot do justice to the cognitive contributions of science and that a more flexible conception can (2007: 32). Grasping also allows the understander to anticipate what would happen if things were relevantly differentnamely, to make correct inferences about the ways in which relevant differences to the truth-values of the involved propositions would influence the inferences that obtain in the actual world. Nevertheless, considering weakly factive construals of objective understanding draws attention to an important pointthat there are also interesting epistemic states in the neighborhood of understanding. This entry surveys the varieties of cognitive success, and some recent efforts to understand some of those varieties. Consider, on this point, that a conspiracy theorist might very well grasp* the connection between (false) propositions so as to achieve a coherent, intelligible, though wildly off-base, picture. In this respect, then, Kvanvigs view achieves the result of a middle ground. The context-sensitive element of Wilkenfelds account of understanding allows him to attribute adequate understanding to, for example, a student in an introductory history class and yet deny understanding to that student when the context shifts to place him in a room with a panel of experts. There is arguably a further principled reason that an overly weak view of the factivity of understanding will not easily be squared with pretheoretical intuitions about understanding. On the basis of considerations Pritchard argues for in various places (2010; 2012; 2013; 2014), relating to cognitive achievements presence in the absence of knowledge (for example. Further, suppose that the self-proclaimed psychic even has reason to believe he is right to think he is psychic, as his friends and family deem that it is safer or kinder to buy into his delusions outwardly. When considering interesting features that might set understanding apart from propositional knowledge, the idea of grasping something is often mentioned. Rationalism is an epistemological theory, so rationalism can be interpreted the distinct aspects or parts of the mind that are separate senses. To the extent that these worries with transparency are apt, a potential obstacle emerges for the prospects of accounting for the value of understanding in terms of its transparency. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. An earlier paper defending the intellectualist view of know-how. and Pritchard, D. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 41(1) (2014): 63-109. Regarding factivity, then, it seems there is room for a view that occupies the middle ground here. Hempel, C. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. 824 Words. Carter (2014) argues that shifting to more demanding practical environments motivates attributing lower degrees of understanding rather than (as Wilkenfeld is suggests) withholding understanding. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) (Vol. Grimm, S. Understanding In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds. Lackey, J. Contains Lackeys counterexamples to the knowledge transmission principles. Firstly, Kvanvig introduces propositional understanding as what is attributed in sentences that take the form I understand that X (for example, John understands that he needs to meet Harold at 2pm). It is worth considering how and in what way a plausible grasping condition on understanding should be held to something like a factivity or accuracy constraint. For example, in Whitcomb (2011) we find the suggestion that theoretical wisdom is a form of particularly deep understanding. Zagzebski (2001), whose view maintains that at least not all cases of understanding require true beliefs, gestures to something like this view. An epistemological shift: from evidence-based medicine to epistemological responsibility J Eval Clin Pract. In a given context, then, one understands some subject matter P only if one approximates fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of P closely enough that one is sufficiently likely to successfully perform any task relating to P that is determined by the context, assuming that one has the skills needed to do so and to exercise them in suitably favorable conditions. Specifically, a very weak view of understandings factivity does not fit with the plausible and often expressed intuition that understanding is something especially epistemically valuable. Zagzebskis weak approach to a factivity constraint aligns with her broadly internalist thinking about what understanding actually does involvenamely, on her view, internal consistency and what she calls transparency. A theoretical advantage to a weak factivity constraint is that it neatly separates propositional knowledge and objectual understanding as interestingly different.
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